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A B S T R A C T   
In many low- and middle-income countries, providers without formal training are an important source of anti-
biotics, but may provide these inappropriately, contributing to the rising burden of drug resistant infections. 
Informal providers (IPs) who practise allopathic medicine are part of India’s pluralistic health system legacy. 
They outnumber formal providers but operate in a policy environment of unclear legitimacy, creating unique 
challenges for antibiotic stewardship. Using a systems approach we analysed the multiple intrinsic (provider 
specific) and extrinsic (community, health and regulatory system and pharmaceutical industry) drivers of 
antibiotic provision by IPs in rural West Bengal, to inform the design of community stewardship interventions. 
We surveyed 291 IPs in randomly selected village clusters in two contrasting districts and conducted in-depth 
interviews with 30 IPs and 17 key informants including pharmaceutical sales representatives, managers and 
wholesalers/retailers; medically qualified private and public doctors and health and regulatory officials. Eight 
focus group discussions were conducted with community members. We found a mosaic or bricolage of informal 
practices conducted by IPs, qualified doctors and industry stakeholders that sustained private enterprise and 
supplemented the weak public health sector. IPs’ intrinsic drivers included misconceptions about the therapeutic 
necessity of antibiotics, and direct and indirect economic benefits, though antibiotics were not the most prof-
itable category of drug sales. Private doctors were a key source of IPs’ learning, often in exchange for referrals. 
IPs constituted a substantial market for local and global pharmaceutical companies that adopted aggressive 
business strategies to exploit less-saturated rural markets. Paradoxically, the top-down nature of regulations 
produced a regulatory impasse wherein regulators were reluctant to enforce heavy sanctions for illegal sales, 
fearing an adverse impact on rural healthcare, but could not implement enabling strategies to improve antibiotic 
provision due to legal barriers. We discuss the implications for a multi-stakeholder antibiotic stewardship 
strategy in this setting.   
1. Background 
Many low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) face a high burden 
of infectious diseases (GBD, 2018) along with high rates of antimicrobial 
resistance (AMR) (Klein et al., 2019). Though per capita antibiotic 
consumption in LMICs is lower than in high income countries-suggesting 
that many people lack access to essential antibiotics – between 2000 and 
2015 antibiotic consumption increased by 77% in LMICs while it 
decreased by 4% in high income countries (Klein et al., 2018). Over-use 
and misuse of antibiotics is a major driver of AMR (Holmes et al., 2016), 
a grave public health threat that could reverse the gains in mortality and 
morbidity of the last century and increase the costs of healthcare (WHO, 
2015), with significant social and economic implications for LMICs. It is 
estimated that 700,000 people die of drug resistant infections every 
year, and this could increase to 10 million by 2050 if the rise in drug 
resistance continues (O’Neill, 2016). In addition, by 2050, annual global 
gross domestic product (GDP) could fall by 3.8%, with poorer countries 
being worst affected due to higher infectious disease prevalence and 
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greater declines in economic growth (World Bank, 2017). 
Antibiotic regulations restrict their prescription to qualified medical 
prescribers (WHO, 2018a), but many people across LMICs obtain anti-
biotics without a prescription from pharmacies, family and friends 
(Morgan et al., 2011) or a variety of ‘informal’ sources (Bloom et al., 
2015). In South Asia a key component of these ‘informal’ providers are 
practitioners who provide consultation services in small ‘clinics’, and 
dispense and/or prescribe allopathic medicines (Gautham et al., 2013). 
Various terms are used for these practitioners including rural medical 
practitioners in India (Nahar et al., 2016) and ‘village doctors’ in 
Bangladesh (Mahmood et al., 2010). The term informal provider can 
also be used to refer to a wider range of actors, including unregistered 
pharmacies, itinerant drug sellers and traditional healers (Sudhinaraset 
et al., 2013), but in this study we focus on informal rural medical 
practitioners in India. 
While the informal provider (IP) term is widely used within India and 
in global health discourse more broadly, we acknowledge its problem-
atic nature. The notion of informality as a group of people or organi-
sations within a given sector or territory (e.g. slum populations), or that 
lacks state authorization, has been challenged by scholars in urban 
studies (Roy, 2005; McFarlane, 2012). They have argued for a broader 
definition of informality as forms of practice that are irregular and 
illegal, whoever these practices are conducted by. For example, 
McFarlane explains that different hybrids of informal and formal prac-
tices enable urban development, like violation of land laws by the legal 
elite to build townships. Further, Roy argues that the state’s own plan-
ning apparatus produces informality through its processes of formal-
ization as these can displace and make illegitimate the most vulnerable 
and powerless. In the health sector, the institutionalization of India’s 
healthcare and medical education system in the 1940s 
de-institutionalized and made illegitimate large numbers of medical li-
centiates and indigenous practitioners (predecessors of the present day 
IPs) without creating an alternative legal, pedagogical or service de-
livery architecture to meet the country’s health needs (Gautham and 
Shyamprasad, 2010). 
So-called ‘IPs’ have therefore continued to exist and meet primary 
healthcare needs over several decades (Leslie, 1976; Rohde JE and 
Vishwanathan, 1995). In rural India, they are frequently the first port of 
call for healthcare and medicines, where access to medically qualified 
doctors and pharmacies is very limited (Gautham et al., 2013; Sabde 
et al., 2011). 
It is difficult to estimate the total number of IPs in India, though they 
are known to vastly outnumber medically qualified doctors (Rao et al., 
2016). A WHO health workforce analysis (Anand and Fan, 2016) found 
that 57% of 632,434 self-defined “allopathic doctors” all over India, and 
81% in rural areas, did not have a medical qualification. Das et al.‘s 
survey of 1519 villages across 19 states is the largest scale survey of rural 
providers in India. They surveyed 3473 providers of whom 68% were 
IPs, 24% were AYUSH providers (collective term for practitioners 
qualified in Ayurveda/Yoga and Naturopathy/Unani/Siddha or Home-
opathy) and only 8% had an MBBS degree (the undergraduate medical 
degree in India) (Das et al., 2020). Data on care seeking from smaller 
studies show that IPs were the first providers sought by 91% patients in 
Uttarakhand, 82% in Andhra Pradesh and 43% in Karnataka, for acute 
illnesses such as diarrhoea, fevers and respiratory tract infections 
(Gautham et al., 2013; George and Iyer, 2013). Primary care currently 
comprises 41% of private out of pocket household expenditure on health 
in India (42% is on secondary and 16% on tertiary care) (GOI, 2019) and 
an overall 68% of outpatient care in rural areas and 74% in urban, is 
sought in the private sector (GOI, 2020). 
IPs operate in an environment of unclear legitimacy, reflecting the 
ambiguous and contradictory laws in this area. According to the Indian 
Medical Council Act, 1956 (GOI, 1956) IPs are illegal. However, the 
Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act (GOI, 2016) distinguishes between 
prescription drugs (Schedules H and H1) and non-prescription drugs 
that can be sold over-the-counter. It could be argued that IPs could 
legally provide the latter, and in fact a few non-governmental organi-
sations offer courses in primary care restricted to non-prescription drugs 
(IRMA, 2020; CIPSACADEMY, 2020). It is generally clear that it is illegal 
for IPs to prescribe or dispense antibiotics, all of which are 
prescription-only medicines. However, the practice of dispensing a va-
riety of antibiotics, especially broad-spectrum ones, is common to IPs in 
different parts of India (Nair et al., 2019a; Khare et al., 2019) and is of 
particular concern for AMR containment in community settings. 
A few programmes engaging with IPs through training and social 
franchising have been evaluated, demonstrating improvements in 
knowledge (Mohanan et al., 2017) and case management (Das et al., 
2016), but not in inappropriate antibiotic dispensing. To address this, an 
in-depth understanding of the drivers of these practices is required. 
While there is plentiful evidence that qualified physicians’ prescribing 
practices are driven by multiple factors including deficits in diagnostic 
knowledge, prescribing cultures, patients’ expectations, financial in-
centives from drugs and the influence of pharmaceutical representatives 
(Xue et al., 2019; Charani et al., 2013; Broom et al., 2014; Kotwani et al., 
2010; Om et al., 2016; Li et al., 2012), there is very limited evidence 
about IPs’ antibiotic use (Nair et al., 2019a, 2019b). 
We address this knowledge gap by conducting a comprehensive 
analysis of the intrinsic and extrinsic drivers of IPs’ antibiotic provision 
in rural West Bengal. We expand our enquiry beyond the IPs themselves 
to include the perspectives of the communities they serve, actors in the 
formal health and regulatory system, and pharmaceutical industry 
stakeholders. Our intention is to provide a firm basis for the design of 
antibiotic stewardship interventions at the community level. 
2. Methods 
2.1. Conceptual framework 
AMR has been described as a health systems problem, arising from 
and in turn affecting health systems adversely (Tomson and Vlad, 2014; 
Ahmad et al., 2019). We agree that a health systems approach, that 
emphasizes a holistic view of the system and its constituents, is funda-
mental to understanding the drivers of IPs’ antibiotic use. We draw on 
the framework developed by Rodrigues et al. (2013) which distinguishes 
between intrinsic drivers or factors (coming from the provider them-
selves) and extrinsic factors (external influences on the provider). 
Intrinsic factors include physicians’ sociodemographic characteristics, 
knowledge, and attitudes such as fear of complications and of losing 
patients if they are not cured. Extrinsic factors include patient-related 
factors (like patients’ expectations and presenting clinical signs and 
symptoms), healthcare system-related factors (like policies, guidelines 
and diagnostic support), and the influence of pharmaceutical companies 
including financial incentives. The framework also emphasizes in-
teractions within and between the factors, such as the influence of 
pharmaceutical marketing on physician’s knowledge that may shape 
their attitudes. 
2.2. Setting 
West Bengal is India’s fourth most populous state with 91 million 
inhabitants (GOI, 2011) and a per capita net state domestic product of 
US$1,333, slightly lower than the average for India (RBI, 2018). We 
selected two contrasting districts: Birbhum, a landlocked district in the 
north, and South 24Parganas (S24P) that extends south of Kolkata and 
includes remote villages in the tidal mangrove forests of the Sundarbans. 
87% of Birbhum’s 3.5 million population and 74% of S24P’s 8.2 million 
population was rural (GoWB, 2014a; GoWB, 2014b). S24P ranked above 
Birbhum on a state level human development ranking (GOWB, 2009a; 
GOWB, 2009b). There were 91 public sector primary (first level at which 
a medically qualified doctor with an MBBS degree should be available) 
and secondary facilities in S24P and 77 in Birbhum (GOI, 2017), giving a 
population per facility of 66,371 in S24P and 39,572 in Birbhum. India’s 
M. Gautham et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
Social Science & Medicine 275 (2021) 113813
3
norm is 1 primary facility for 30,000 population (GOI, 2014-15). 
2.3. Data collection 
We used a sequential, explanatory mixed methods approach (Cres-
well et al., 2003), starting with focus group discussions (FGDs) with 
community members and a structured survey with IPs, followed by 
in-depth interviews (IDIs) with IPs and other stakeholders. The results 
primarily draw on the qualitative data from IDIs and FGDs and these are 
presented in a qualitative style, supplemented by quantitative survey 
data to characterise the providers and their antibiotic provision. 
As there was no existing sampling frame of IPs we adopted a census 
approach by surveying every IP within randomly selected clusters 
(O’Connell et al., 2013). A cluster was an administrative grouping of 
villages called ‘gram-panchayat’, of which there were 310 in S24P and 
167 in Birbhum with an estimated 15 IPs per gram-panchayat in S24P 
and 7–8 in Birbhum. A sample size of 150 IPs per district was calculated, 
conservatively assuming 50% prevalence of indicators of interest at 95% 
confidence interval and 10% margin of error, with a design effect of 1.5. 
To obtain this sample size, 11 grampanchayats in S24P and 7 adjacent 
pairs of gram panchayats in Birbhum were randomly selected. IPs were 
defined as unqualified providers who provided consultation services and 
dispensed/prescribed drugs. Retail pharmacies and government com-
munity health workers were excluded. We consulted IP associations and 
village key informants to identify all IPs in the study sites. 
The survey tool explored IPs’ demographic characteristics, education 
and training, service provision, knowledge of antibiotics and resistance, 
patterns of antibiotic provision, patient characteristics and interactions 
with the pharmaceutical industry, health department and medically 
qualified allopathic doctors (we use the term doctor to refer to both 
graduate (with an MBBS degree) and post graduate (with an MD degree) 
physicians in either the public or private sector). The tool (in Bengali) 
was piloted twice and the survey conducted during February to May 
2017 by trained researchers supervised by the PI and study coordinator. 
IDIs were conducted with 15 IPs per district (30 in total), purposively 
sampled to represent variation in their antibiotic provision, geograph-
ical location, and mode of dispensing and/or prescribing drugs. The IDIs 
explored IPs’ motivations for antibiotic provision and details of their 
interactions with pharmaceutical, regulatory and formal sector actors. 
The topic guide was piloted, and interviews conducted from May to 
August 2017. IDIs were also conducted with 17 other stakeholders, 
identified through snowballing: five public and private doctors, eight 
pharmaceutical representatives including managers, sales representa-
tives and wholesalers who supplied antibiotics to IPs, three regulatory 
and health department officials and one leader of an IP association. 
Community perceptions were obtained through eight FGDs (four in each 
district: two with men and two with women), with 8–12 participants 
each. FGDs and IDIs were conducted in private spaces to promote 
confidentiality and each lasted 60–90 min. 
2.4. Data management and analysis 
Survey data were entered in Excel and analysed descriptively using 
Stata IC 14.2. IDIs and FGDs were audio-recorded, except for seven IDIs 
where consent to audio-recording was not granted; detailed notes were 
taken for these. Transcripts and field notes were translated into English. 
The PI and study coordinator developed a coding tree reflecting the 
intrinsic and extrinsic thematic areas (a deductive approach) as well as 
themes emerging from the data (an inductive approach) (Creswell et al., 
2003). To strengthen validity, data were coded separately by pairs of 
researchers and then compared, and initial findings were shared with 
small groups of IPs, pharmaceutical representatives and health depart-
ment officials for feedback. Key themes, concepts and emergent cate-
gories were analysed using the framework approach, and interpreted in 
the broader health systems context (Spencer et al., 2003). 
Ethical approval was obtained from the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine the Ethics Committee and the Institutional Re-
view Board of the Centre for Media Studies (CMS-IRB), New Delhi, India. 
Signed consent was obtained from survey and IDI interviewees and 
verbal consent audio-recorded for FGDs. 
3. Results 
3.1. Overview of IPs and their antibiotic provision 
We identified 326 IPs in the 25 grampanchayats: 151 in Birbhum and 
175 in S24P. All were invited to participate in the survey, with eight 
declining to be interviewed and 15 unavailable. Of the 303 surveyed, 
291 (96%) practised allopathic medicine and 12 (4%) practiced only 
homeopathy. Our antibiotics survey data were collected from the 291 
allopathy practitioners, of whom 55% only practised allopathy while the 
rest practised a blend of allopathic and traditional medical systems, 
including Ayurveda (30%), homeopathy (6%) and Unani (2%) (Table 1). 
Of the 291, 75% had paramedical certifications such as certificates of 
Rural Medical Practice, Community Medical Service, diplomas in 
‘alternative medicine’ and others. Six had a certificate in pharmacy, four 
had completed lab assistants’ courses and three dental assistants’ 
courses. 
Table 1 
IPs’ background and services.  
Characteristics N = 291 
Gender Male 98% 
Age ≤35 years 21% 
36–45 years 32% 
46–55 years 24% 
>55 years 23% 
Religion Hindu 65% 
Muslim 35% 
School education Up to class 10 31% 
Up to class 12 35% 
Graduate or postgraduate 34% 
Any health certification 75% 
Worked as a compounder to formal doctors 84% 
Years of practice ≤10 years 29% 
10.1–20 years 36% 
>20 years 35% 
Operate out of a small clinic 99% 
Practice in more than one clinic 20% 
Other source of income 37% 
Dispense antibiotics 95% 
Prescribe antibiotics 88% 
System of medicine practised 
Only allopathy 55% 
Allopathy and Ayurveda 30% 
Allopathy and Homeopathy 6% 
Allopathy and Unani 2% 
Allopathy, Ayurveda, Homeopathy 3% 
Allopathy, Ayurveda, Unani 2% 
Allopathy, Ayurveda, Unani, Homeopathy 2% 
Health services 
Outpatient care 97% 
Inpatient care 16% 
Diabetes 66% 
Hypertension 90% 
Dental care 91% 
Eye care 86% 
Wound suturing 89% 
Small surgeries (e.g. draining an abscess) 78% 
Piles 6% 
Delivery care 23% 
Abortions 19% 
Animal healthcare (mainly cattle and poultry) 34% 
Mean number of patients out of every ten who belong to the lowest socio- 
economic groups (daily wage workers) 
7/10 
Mean number of patients out of every ten who come from villages within 
5 kms 
8/10  
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Nearly all IPs surveyed (98%) were male (Table 1). Around 70% had 
over 10 years of schooling and 34% reported sufficient literacy to read 
medical books. None had yet received the state government’s training 
that was launched just before this study, but 18% had been trained 
through a precursor training by a local organisation. Ninety-nine 
percent practised out of small clinics that differed in room space and 
building material, but resembled the clinics of formal doctors in that 
they were equipped with a table, chair and a patient’s stool, a curtained 
off examination area, a waiting area with benches, equipment like a 
stethoscope and blood pressure monitor and medicines displayed in a 
cabinet. For the majority, this was their sole source of income, but 37% 
had other sources including agriculture. Ninety-seven percent of IPs 
reported providing outpatient care for fever, diarrhoea and cold/cough 
but 16% also provided inpatient care. Many reported providing services 
for hypertension (90%), diabetes (66%), dental care (91%) and eye care 
(86%). They saw a daily average of 32 patients in Birbhum and 22 in 
S24P. In both districts on average IPs reported that seven out of every 
ten patients were from the lowest socio-economic groups and engaged in 
daily wage labour. Eight out of every ten patients came from nearby 
villages, from within a distance of 5 kms. 
IPs typically dispensed antibiotics (reported by 95%) and charged for 
these, rather than the consultation alone; 88% also prescribed. From the 
qualitative interviews we learned that IPs prescribed when they had no 
stock or when the patient could not pay for the full course (in which case 
a partial amount was dispensed and the rest prescribed). A majority 
(75%) of the surveyed IPs dispensed at least one antibiotic to more than 
three patients out of every ten (Fig. 1), and an average of five patients 
out of every ten. Amoxicillin was dispensed most frequently, followed by 
cefixime, ciprofloxacin, azithromycin and ampicillin (Fig. 2). By WHO’s 
AWARE classification of antibiotics (ACCESS, WATCH, RESERVE) 
(WHO, 2019), amoxicillin and ampicillin are ACCESS antibiotics that 
should be widely available. The others belong to the WATCH category 
and should be monitored due to their higher risk of selection for resis-
tance. Two IPs had tried linezolid, a RESERVE category antibiotic, on 
patients not responding to other drugs. 
Both the survey and IDIs suggested that on average, two to three-day 
courses of antibiotics were dispensed, usually as tablets and sometimes 
as injectables for severe cases or for those who did not respond to oral 
drugs. 
3.2. Intrinsic drivers 
Qualitative findings from the IDIs suggested that IPs’ intrinsic drivers 
stemmed from an interplay between limited knowledge about antibi-
otics and their economic interests. Believing that antibiotics could cure 
most illnesses, they considered them indispensable for primary care. The 
choice and dosage of antibiotics was based on IPs’ experiences of the 
effectiveness of different antibiotics for specific symptoms. They felt 
confident with some degree of experimentation. For example, one IP 
said that if a patient had visited another provider before coming to him, 
he would give him a ‘double antibiotic’ (two different antibiotics) for 
quick recovery. Some said they might extend the course to 10 or 15 days 
if a shorter course did not work, and others said they would change the 
antibiotic if required: 
If I see that a medicine is not working, I twist it and give it to the 
patient. Twisting means if I see that amoxicillin is not working, I give 
ciprofloxacin. If ciprofloxacin doesn’t work, I give ofloxacin... 
(IPS11010102) 
Behind this arbitrary antibiotic use lay several knowledge gaps. For 
example, the survey data showed that only 30% of IPs knew that anti-
biotics cannot cure viral infections and only 35% correctly associated 
resistance with bacteria rather than the human body (see Supplementary 
Table S1). Their understanding of resistance was limited to simple in-
ferences like ‘antibiotics are becoming the food of the bacteria instead of 
killing them’ (IPS08050303) or ‘patients stopping antibiotics makes them 
resistant’ (IPS08050303). Only 41% were aware of any laws about the 
sale and use of antibiotics. In the IDIs, most spoke openly about using 
Fig. 1. Number of patients out of every ten daily patients who receive an antibiotic.  
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antibiotics and saw nothing wrong or unlawful about this ‘basic’ prac-
tice: ‘I provide basic treatment. In case of fever with shivering, or normal 
fever we give medicine for two three days…amoxicillin or cc efixime’ 
(IPB02130501). Many IPs spoke proudly about their knowledge of a 
variety of antibiotics. 
Believing antibiotics to be a therapeutic necessity, IPs feared that 
‘without antibiotics, patients will not be cured, and they will not visit me 
again’ (IPS06080405), which would adversely affect their patient foot-
fall and income. In the IDIs, IPs estimated that antibiotic sales contrib-
uted 20%–30% to their incomes, through the margins between the retail 
price (paid by patients) and the price paid by IPs to wholesalers/re-
tailers. The most expensive branded antibiotics and the cheapest ones 
were both said to provide high profit margins. However, many IPs said 
that the most expensive were beyond the paying capacity of patients, 
while the cheapest products could be poor quality and ineffective, 
damaging their reputation amongst patients. Hence, they preferred 
modestly priced brands even if they were less profitable, in relative or 
absolute terms. Antibiotics however were said to be less profitable than 
some other medicines such as vitamins, antacids and analgesics. 
3.3. Extrinsic drivers 
3.3.1. Patients’ physical and economic needs 
Community members participating in FGDs displayed mixed 
awareness of antibiotics, indeed some had not heard of them, and we did 
not find much evidence of people demanding antibiotics when ill. 
However, most people did need to recover quickly due to the precarious 
daily wage nature of their work, and at a cost that was affordable. They 
relied on IPs as a primary source of healthcare and antibiotics: ‘Because 
Siuiri [town] is too far for me (30 kms) and you cannot travel that long with 
your sick child…we visit this ‘kaku’ [uncle-an IP] for primary treatment’ 
(Women’s FGD2, Birbhum). 
IPs had to live up to more than expectations of effective treatment; 
they also had to be responsive to each patient’s paying capacity, which 
in turn determined the choice of antibiotic and how much of the course 
was dispensed, resulting frequently in sub-optimal courses. However, 
some FGD participants said they preferred to buy antibiotics from IPs 
and pharmacies rather than receive them free at government facilities: 
‘It is a belief that whatever (medicines) we get free of cost or at lower 
cost from government ‘fair price shop’ [public-private partnership 
pharmacies at bigger government health facilities]… are less effec-
tive than those we purchase from the market or from ‘local doctors’ 
(IPs).’ (Men’s FGD2, S24P) 
Other informal practices reported by community members included 
self-medication and arbitrary dosing (by those who knew a little about 
antibiotics) and not completing the full course. Several female and male 
FGD participants said they stopped taking an antibiotic when they 
started feeling better, though they had heard antibiotics should be taken 
for 5–7 days. Some women said that while their children and husbands 
often completed the full course, they themselves did not, in order to save 
money. Other reasons for stopping antibiotics mid-course included side- 
effects such as nausea and loss of appetite. Two FGD participants 
explained that allopathic medicines generated heat in the body, a 
perception consistent with traditional, non-biomedical explanatory 
models of illnesses linked to different types of foods and seasonality 
(Payyappallimana and Venkatasubramanian, 2016). 
3.3.2. Economic and social relationships with medically qualified doctors 
IDIs revealed that medically qualified doctors, with MBBS as well as 
post graduate specialisations and especially private ones, were an 
important influence on IPs’ treatment practices, reflecting their eco-
nomic interdependence. IPs received lifelong informal training from 
their doctor mentors whom they referred to as their ‘gurus’ [teachers]For 
example, 84% of IPs surveyed reported having worked as a doctor’s 
compounder or assistant, after which the doctor continued to mentor 
them. Some IPs said that when in doubt, they consulted doctors they 
knew, who advised them ‘which medicine to give after what and what 
should be the dosage based on patient’s details’ (IPS11010102). For 
example, one IP received this advice for treating a patient with high 
fever who was not responding to an anti-malarial: 
‘The doctor Sir told me to give small amount of Monocef [3rd gen-
eration cephalosporin antibiotic] injection on the layer of his skin to 
check whether the patient has any allergy or not. If it is found okay, 
then apply the full dosage.’ (IPS06080101) 
IP associations invited local doctors to lecture to their association 
members, and doctors attached to private hospitals in urban areas were 
said to train on emerging noncommunicable conditions, including can-
cers, heart conditions and diabetes. One IP said: 
Fig. 2. Most commonly dispensed/prescribed antibiotics by IPs (self-reported). *ACCESS antibiotics **WATCH antibiotics (WHO, 2019).  
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‘They said… If you see that the BP [blood pressure] is high, give 
necessary medicine… which a doctor can only give, but if we see a 
patient with nausea, high blood pressure, myocardial infarction.. we 
are allowed to give atorvastatin, clopidogrel, amlodipine…in order 
to save the patient’s life...if the blood pressure is not becoming 
normal you must transfer the case to us.’ (IPS09070303) 
IPs also learned indirectly from doctors by following their pre-
scriptions brought by patients. While one might expect these in-
teractions to enhance IP practices, our IDIs with several stakeholders 
revealed that qualified doctors also commonly engaged in non- 
standardised antibiotic use themselves, attributing this to economic in-
centives, lack of suitable guidelines, lack of diagnostic facilities in rural 
areas and regulatory challenges. One public sector official saw this as 
primarily a private sector problem: 
‘We do not have any control on private practicing formal doctors. We 
know they have been using unnecessary antibiotics randomly. We 
cannot take any action against them till we get any complaint from 
patient or any other end. Actually, there is no guideline of antibiotic 
use for formal doctors.’ (Senior government official, BGOKII01) 
On the other hand, there were also examples of the positive influence 
of doctors as mentors. A few IPs who had reported lesser antibiotic use 
than others in the survey, in the IDIs fondly described their ‘guru’, 
meaning teacher or mentor, who had cautioned them to be careful with 
antibiotic provision: 
‘I was in Rakhhaskhali for 3 years with a rural health practitioner…in 
that time period I used painkillers and antibiotics hugely. After that I 
met Dr. X (a medically qualified doctor). I was with him as a 
compounder. Dr. X used antibiotic less than less. He doesn’t even 
prescribe a painkiller..only paracetamol. I became habituated...’ 
(IPS10040502) 
These relationships were not without mutual gains. Private doctors 
were said to have an unspoken understanding with IPs about sharing 
medical knowledge in exchange for patient referrals; however a few 
doctors whom we interviewed in-depth also attributed this to the lack of 
formal healthcare in rural areas and the fact that IPs were ‘always 
available, for 24 h, anytime of the day’ (Private doctor, SPFDKII01). One 
doctor said that IPs should be allowed to use some antibiotics for this 
reason: 
‘We tell them to provide general medicine...but diarrhoea can be a 
problem…in that case we ask them to use Norflox [norfloxacin] in 
order to control the situation. This much we can allow them… 
because in the rural areas people are not able to bear that many 
expenses (to come to town)’. (Private doctor, BPFDKII01) 
Hence, relationships between IPs and doctors in this setting were 
based on more than just economic gains, extending to concern for 
providing practical solutions for primary healthcare provision in rural 
areas. 
3.3.3. Expanding the pharmaceutical industry’s market 
IDIs further revealed that IPs represented a significant market for 
many pharmaceutical industry actors, local as well as global, with 
considerable drug promotion and marketing aimed at IPs. 
Pharmaceutical companies organised educational programmes for 
IPs that were inclusive of meals and professionally conducted by local 
medically qualified doctors: ‘Now they show everything on a giant screen 
following which the formal doctors explain to us about the topic and medi-
cines’ (IPS08050303). Some IPs and pharmaceutical sales representa-
tives referred to these as Continuing Medical Education (CME) 
programmes, reflecting medical professionals’ vocabulary. The aim was 
to train IPs and to promote the products: 
‘They do not come to meet us only for the trainings. They also want 
their products to be sold in the market. They tell us to prescribe their 
products and give our feedback of the product regarding its effi-
ciency.’ (IPS06080405) 
Training topics included chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, 
respiratory diseases, fever and diarrhoea, medicines, root canal therapy, 
treatment of mouth cancers, fungal infections and skin care. 
Pharmaceutical sales representatives, better known as medical rep-
resentatives (MRs), offered various incentives to IPs including free drug 
samples and offers such as ‘if you buy 10 strips of that molecule product 
from us you get one strip for free’ (MR, BMRKII02). In the survey, 70% of 
IPs reported visits by MRs in the last month and 60% had received free 
samples. Free samples typically included a few tablets, for example a 2- 
day course of an antibiotic. IPs said they liked these samples because 
they were of good quality, and they could dispense them free or at low 
cost to poor patients, notwithstanding that these were not full treatment 
courses. 
Some pharmaceutical company interviewees reported that antibi-
otics were the number one market in drug sales in West Bengal and all 
over India. The market was intensely competitive and all companies 
including global players were said to have rural divisions that focused on 
marketing in rural areas because ‘if they don’t, they won’t be able to exist’ 
(Wholesaler, BWSKII01). In fact, four IPs reported that in the last five 
years they had attended 8–10 trainings organised by global and local 
pharmaceutical companies. The IDIs highlighted that IPs were a major 
commercial segment in the rural pharmaceutical market: 
‘One MR is working from Kolkata to Kakdip (distance of 88kms). His 
monthly target is rupees 100,000. Rupees 80,000 comes from 
[selling antibiotics to] the RMPs [local term for informal providers] 
only. Rest of the rupees 20,000 is earned from the formal doctors.’ 
(Pharmaceutical manager, SMRKII01) 
MRs were said to be under constant pressure to meet sales targets 
that were reviewed every quarter. They were increasingly trained to 
analyse provider behaviour and in aggressive marketing techniques: 
‘Earlier they used to train the MRs about in-depth product knowl-
edge, human anatomy, physiology and the medicines that the com-
pany offers. Now, they focus on marketing and train the MRs on how 
to convert a doctor.’ (MR, BMRKII02) 
Besides pharmaceutical manufacturing and marketing companies, 
the market included an elaborate drug distribution network of stockists 
and distributors, wholesalers and retailers. Business models in this 
supply chain followed a demand generation strategy or ‘pushing sell’ in 
the words of a small stockist who supplied IPs and retail outlets in vil-
lages, with discounts on the drug’s maximum retail price built into each 
rung of the supply chain right down to the IPs. 
There were also some reports of cheap and possibly sub-standard 
products available in wholesale shops in different parts of the state, 
and a category of unregulated middlemen called ‘daily passengers of 
medicine’ who purchased drugs and free samples that MRs give to 
physicians, and sold them mainly to IPs and small retail pharmacies in 
rural areas. 
3.3.4. The public health sector’s reliance on IPs 
IPs were seen as playing an important role in supplementing the 
government health system in rural areas. For example, in one remote 
block (with 250,000 population) about 100 kms from Kolkata, there was 
only one resident government doctor and two visiting NGO doctors, and 
2500 IPs (800 IPs for every doctor). Even in our less remote sites, IPs 
were seen as an important part of the local healthcare system: ‘They are 
the main component of rural healthcare delivery system. We cannot exclude 
them..’ (Government official, BGOKII02). 
Public sector interviewees were willing to discuss IPs with an 
openness we had not anticipated. One government doctor said that the 
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state government’s policy to train IPs had made it easier for them to 
engage more openly with IPs. Some primary health centres invited their 
local IPs for regular meetings in order to improve their role in com-
munity healthcare, reduce inappropriate drug use and increase timeli-
ness of referrals. The public sector’s dependence on IPs was different 
from the one-on-one relationships between IPs and private doctors. A 
senior government stakeholder acknowledged that if IPs were con-
strained or arrested, the rural health system would be adversely affected. 
‘We don’t catch the informal providers because we know that if we 
do, we won’t be able to balance the health condition in the society. 
The situation of the rural health system will deteriorate.’ (Senior 
government official, SGOKII03) 
3.3.5. Regulatory challenges 
Several gaps in the interpretation and enforcement of medical and 
drug related regulations created a regulatory impasse in terms of IP 
engagement. 
As noted in the introduction, only medically qualified providers can 
legally prescribe antibiotics. The national government also allows public 
sector Auxiliary Nurse Midwives to administer gentamycin and amoxi-
cillin for infants with pneumonia (GoWB, 2014c), and the West Bengal 
government allows qualified AYUSH (Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha and 
Homeopathy) practitioners to use selected antibiotics (Singhania, 
2017). However, with respect to IPs, there were varied perceptions of 
what was allowed. One senior district official said that IPs can use some 
antibiotics: ‘They are allowed to use co-trimoxazole, amoxicillin, ranitidine, 
metronidazole, paracetamol, etc. which are also available in PHC [Primary 
Health Centre]’ (Government official, BGOKII02). On the other hand, a 
state official said that IPs were not permitted to use antibiotics and it 
would need a national government order to permit them. 
The regulatory authorities for the manufacture and sales of drugs 
were aware of illegal, over-the-counter sales of antibiotics but said their 
department was under-resourced, with only 150 inspectors to monitor 
the 50,000 registered pharmacies in West Bengal, much less the count-
less unlicensed pharmacies and IPs. Besides, drugs inspectors were 
reluctant to take any action unless they had higher orders, and as noted 
above, the higher health and regulatory authorities did not necessarily 
want IPs to be sanctioned or prosecuted, due to concerns about 
restricting access to healthcare and to antibiotics and the political con-
sequences of this. 
However, opposition from medical professionals at the state and 
national level prevented the government and local authorities from 
relaxing the laws or including selected antibiotic provision in IP 
training. 
‘..The main problem is MCI [Medical Council of India]. They are not 
allowing any short course (for mid-level providers) for the informal 
providers…. the fact is that everyone is concerned about their own 
boundaries and interests.’ (Senior government official, SGOKII03) 
This had created a paradoxical situation where it was easier for 
health authorities to overlook unrestricted antibiotic use than take 
practical steps towards improving IPs’ antibiotic dispensing by allowing 
them to use a few essential antibiotics in a regulated manner. 
4. Discussion 
Compared with WHO’s prescription indicators that 20%–30% of 
clinical encounters in LMICs may need an antibiotic (Isah et al., 2002; 
WHO, 2006), antibiotic provision in our study was excessive at an 
estimated 50%. Although our estimation was based on self-reported data 
which can be biased (Kruger and Dunning, 1999), one might expect this 
if anything to be an under-estimate of true rates. Indeed, Khare et al. 
reported that 75% of IP prescriptions in Madhya Pradesh included an-
tibiotics and these were prescribed more often than other drugs (Khare 
et al., 2019). Our findings are consistent with general trends in antibiotic 
prescribing across India and Africa (Kenya) where around half of all 
patients in primary care settings receive an antibiotic (Sulis et al., 2020). 
Our study also revealed haphazard patterns of antibiotic selection and 
dosing, with little systematic relation to standard treatment guidelines 
or regulatory rules. The frequency, extent and patterns of antibiotic 
consumption are a concern in this setting as antibiotic overuse and 
misuse is a primary driver of AMR (Holmes et al., 2016). A strong as-
sociation exists between the number of antibiotic courses prescribed 
over 12 months and bacterial resistance to those antibiotics in an indi-
vidual (Costelloe et al., 2010). By interviewing a wide range of key 
stakeholders, we provide a holistic analysis of the intrinsic and extrinsic 
drivers of antibiotic provision by rural IPs and how these interact, be-
tween and amongst themselves, to co-produce a culture of informal 
antibiotic practices (Fig. 3). This analysis allows us to add more depth 
and new insights to existing evidence. 
Compared to the study in Madhya Pradesh (Khare et al., 2019) that 
reported higher ciprofloxacin (a WATCH antibiotic) use, IPs in our study 
most frequently usd amoxicillin, an ACCESS antibiotic. Notwithstanding 
that all antibiotics are prescription-only, this is more in line with WHO’s 
recommendations (WHO, 2019). The absence of RESERVE antibiotics 
like carbapenems and colistin, in our study and in Madhya Pradesh, was 
notable. One reason could be that carbapenems are contained in the H1 
Schedule of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, which is taken more seriously 
than Schedule H by pharmacies and regulatory authorities (Miller et al., 
2018) as it incurs a more severe punishment. However, the H1 schedule 
is currently not aligned with the AWARE categorisation and this could 
be a reason why Linezolid, a RESERVE antibiotic, but not in the H1 
Schedule, was being promoted in our sites. India’s drug regulatory au-
thorities could consider aligning the H and H1 antibiotics with WHO’s 
categories. 
We found that IPs’ intrinsic drivers resulted from an interplay be-
tween misconceived notions of antibiotics being a therapeutic necessity 
and their economic needs, contributing about 20%–30% to IPs’ incomes. 
This is partly in line with Nair et al.‘s finding that IPs perceive antibiotics 
as essential for patient retention and indirectly ensuring their liveli-
hoods (Nair et al., 2019a), and with a study from Vietnam where anti-
biotics accounted for 24% and 18% of revenues in urban and rural 
pharmacies (Nga et al., 2014). Interestingly, in both Vietnam and West 
Bengal, antibiotics were not the drugs with the highest profit-margins. 
IPs in our study said they chose antibiotic brands to fit with afford-
ability for patients and they customized sub-optimal packages that 
depended on the paying capacity of patients. Economic constraints and 
perceptions of harm from medicine use also led patients to stop antibi-
otics mid-course. 
While the role of patient demand for antibiotics has been emphasised 
in the literature (Nair et al., 2019a; Wilkinson et al., 2018) mainly in the 
context of qualified prescribers, our findings indicate that this may be 
less relevant in this context with community FGD participants having 
limited knowledge about antibiotics and not specifically asking for 
them. They wanted value for money: the best quality treatment at an 
affordable price. This interplay between knowledge/perceptions and 
economic drivers for both IPs and patients is critical from a stewardship 
perspective, because addressing one without the other would likely lead 
to limited impact. 
Besides patients, the main extrinsic drivers of IPs’ antibiotic provi-
sion stemmed from the pharmaceutical industry, and the formal health 
and regulatory sectors. Nair et al.’s study has emphasised the role of MRs 
in unethical drug promotion and marketing (Nair et al., 2019a). Our 
findings show that MRs are just the visible face of an industry that has 
aggressive business strategies. Our interviewees described the signifi-
cance of IPs for corporate revenues and said that companies needed a 
‘rural marketing division’ to survive. Market research data reveal that 
the Indian pharmaceutical industry is one of the largest in the world and 
among the fastest growing (IBEF, 2019). Almost half its turnover is from 
the domestic market which is projected to increase 9–12% in the coming 
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five years, with much of this growth expected from increasing pene-
tration of sales in rural areas as urban markets become saturated. The 
industry is large and fragmented with an estimated 10,500 manufac-
turers (IBEF, 2019), intensifying domestic competition and increasing 
regulatory challenges. 
IPs’ economic and mentoring relationships with medically qualified 
private doctors supported and sustained their antibiotic use through 
exchange of knowledge for referrals. The mentorship role of doctors is 
arguably a key driver, as their antibiotic prescribing has been found to 
be 55% higher than that of IPs (Sulis et al., 2020), and even doctors more 
likely to provide correct treatment are equally likely to give an unnec-
essary antibiotic (Das et al., 2020). Studies confirm the relationships 
between doctors and IPs for antibiotics (Nair et al., 2019a) and for other 
health services as well (Nahar et al., 2016; Chandra and Bhattacharya, 
2019). However, the public health sector’s reliance on IPs is not well 
articulated in literature, even less its implications for the implementa-
tion of regulations. Our study shows that IPs tacitly supplement the 
public health system in rural areas, raising practical and ethical di-
lemmas for regulators responsible for enforcing top-down regulations. 
Laws related to antibiotic sales added another twist as they prevented 
the design of practical solutions. It was easier for regulators to ignore 
regulatory infringements than allow regulatory leeway for some anti-
biotics to be sold without a prescription so the rest could be monitored 
effectively. Poor regulatory enforcement in India has been attributed to 
weak capacity and ambiguity of laws (Sheikh et al., 2013; Chandra and 
Bhattacharya, 2019); in addition we found that a disconnect between 
top-down regulations and people’s health needs had created a regula-
tory impasse that acted as a barrier for antibiotic stewardship and 
effective IP solutions. 
Drawing on the expanded notion of informality as forms of irregular 
practice rather than a specific set of providers, our findings reveal a 
mosaic of informal practices in this health market by IPs, community 
members, medically qualified doctors, pharmaceutical companies and 
public health authorities. Multiple actors have improvised a practical 
system of rural healthcare with its own informal service delivery ar-
chitecture, knowledge and referral pathways and supply chains. Akin to 
the bricolage of urban planning (McFarlane, 2012), this hybrid of 
informal and formal practices also sustains an expanding pharmaceu-
tical industry and private healthcare in urban India, and supplements a 
weak public health sector in rural areas. 
The generalisability of our findings to other states and urban India is 
not without limitations, though the main themes are likely to be 
Fig. 3. Drivers of antibiotic provision by informal providers.  
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common, given the health system weaknesses across India. Despite 
greater physical accessibility of qualified health providers, the urban 
poor also seek care from IPs (Priya et al., 2019), reflecting consider-
ations of affordability, comfort and trust (Ergler et al., 2011). It is also 
likely that during the Covid-19 pandemic use of both IPs and antibiotics 
may have increased. 
Our findings emphasise that an effective antibiotic stewardship 
strategy must consider IPs as one actor within the wider rural healthcare 
bricolage. The number of extrinsic drivers influencing IP behaviours, 
and their inter-relationships, suggest that a wide range of regulatory, 
educational and behaviour change interventions, targeting multiple 
stakeholders, are needed over the short and long terms. We present a 
conceptual framework (with the acronym BRIGHT-see Fig. 4) to depict 
these broad health system and antibiotic stewardship interventions 
needed across multiple actors. These will involve community/public 
behaviour change interventions that are very limited at present in LMICs 
(Batura et al., 2018). First however, interventions are needed at the 
opposite end of the supply chain, to address the marketing strategies of 
large pharmaceutical companies, and balance pharmaceutical expan-
sion with antibiotic stewardship. As the actions of pharmaceutical MRs 
are driven by the business models of corporate giants, appropriate 
boundaries need to be defined for the marketing of antibiotics by com-
panies, supported by an enhanced role of public health bodies in public 
and provider education (Edwards et al., 2018). We need to engage with 
the corporates, starting with those that have expressed commitments to 
tackle AMR (AMF, 2020), and further research is needed to understand 
the distribution of incentives for stakeholders throughout 
pharmaceutical value chains. 
Large scale and sustained antibiotic stewardship in these settings will 
require addressing the legitimacy of IPs within the overall health system. 
IPs’ illegitimacy is an historical artefact of the state’s formalization of 
the medical profession in India that displaced many rural providers 
without creating suitable alternatives. Laws designed to regulate the 
medical profession criminalise IPs without providing suitable frame-
works for regulating their services and antibiotic provision. While 
regulation is seen as a solution to inappropriate antibiotic use, in this 
context, top-down regulations are creating a barrier for both expanding 
healthcare coverage and AMR containment (Porter et al., 2020). 
Addressing this impasse would allow for innovative approaches like 
‘smart’ regulation - that incorporate a range of instruments and actors to 
optimise win-win outcomes (ibid)- to be used to design suitable frame-
works for provision of a limited range of ACCESS antibiotics by IPs 
through collaborative stepped-care models (Patel et al., 2010) with 
medically qualified doctors and the broader public health system. 
India stands committed to Universal Health Coverage (UHC) but 
global UHC tracer indicators focus on vertical conditions (like coverage 
of family planning, immunization, care for tuberculosis and HIV) and on 
health workers qualified as per western standards (physicians, surgeons, 
psychiatrists) (Abiiro and De Allegri, 2015; Hogan et al., 2018); these 
could limit real expansion of primary care. However, the global UHC 
and primary care discourse now encompasses the private health sector 
including the informal sector (WHO, 2018b) and this can enable coun-
tries like India adopt a decolonized lens to recognise the potential of a 
pluralistic health workforce for improving universal coverage. The 
Fig. 4. BRIGHT: a framework for conceptualising 
interconnected interventions in the primary health-
care, regulatory and pharmaceutical systems that are 
required to address antibiotic stewardship in com-
munity settings in a sustainable way. Balance; Re-
form; Integrate; Guidelines; Harness; Train (see 
explanations provided in the respective circles in the 
figure) *stepped care: a healthcare delivery model 
developed for mental healthcare where lay health 
workers deliver basic care at the first level and pri-
mary care physicians and specialists provide 
advanced care at higher levels (Patel et al., 2010).   
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Indian government’s hospitalisation insurance programme for 500 
million poor households, under its Ayushman Bharat Scheme (GOI, 
2021) includes the private secondary and tertiary sectors. Plans to 
strengthen rural primary care include upgrading the public sector’s 119, 
628 sub-centres and 25,743 primary health centres as Health and 
Wellness centres (NHM, 2020) with mid-level providers delivering pri-
mary care. However, even when fully functional, these numbers may be 
inadequate for India’s 800 million rural population. Smaller solo private 
practitioners and IPs could be concurrently integrated into UHC initia-
tives to improve healthcare and AMR stewardship and improve the ef-
ficiency of private out of pocket expenditure on primary care (41%). The 
latter could perhaps be addressed through alternative pre-payment 
methods like micro-health insurance (Habib et al., 2016). 
In high income countries, educational strategies combined with 
prescription restrictions and separation of dispensing from prescribing 
have helped control economic incentives for physician’s prescribing 
(Lim et al., 2019), but such a separation might be difficult to enforce in 
India given current business models. In LMICs, successful strategies with 
formal providers and drug sellers include knowledge enhancement, 
antibiotic guidelines and decision support, audit and review, peer su-
pervision and performance-based incentives (Bagonza et al., 2020; 
Wilkinson et al., 2018). Private sector literature also highlights the role 
of supply side interventions that address provider quality and incentives. 
Social franchising models for example, offer provider training and social 
marketing of commodities, to encourage consumer behaviour change by 
stimulating demand for public health products like contraceptives, Oral 
Rehydration Solution (ORS) and zinc (for diarrhoea), antimalarials and 
bed-nets (Montagu and Goodman, 2016). These have had mixed results 
in India, with one donor funded initiative leading to increased ORS and 
zinc use in one state but not in another (Lam et al., 2019), while another 
social franchising and telemedicine programme failed to improve IPs’ 
performance (Mohanan et al., 2017). Programme designs may have been 
weak, or lacked appeal for IPs with established practices who saw no 
added benefits of joining social franchises. The public sector in India has 
experimented with pre-packaged drug kits for management of sexually 
transmitted diseases, but ensuring uninterrupted supplies is challenging 
(Jha, 2014). With some limitations, these examples might offer lessons 
for marketing of antibiotic kits for IPs, supported by guidelines, targeted 
training and peer review and supervisory systems for antibiotic behav-
iour change across all providers types. In sum, given the 
multi-stakeholder influences on antibiotic use in this setting, we 
recommend a multi-stakeholder approach for designing and imple-
menting crosscutting interventions. 
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